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Abstract
Starting from some of the most recent literature developed after the world financial
crisis, it has been developed a model with heterogeneous agents and an active interbank
market, characterized by an endogenous default probability. The key feature of the
analysis is that the probability of default evolves endogenously and is taken into account
by banks in their investment decisions. In each period banks, that are heterogeneous,
decide to invest only a part, or even none, of their surplus funds on loans to other financial
institutions, if the probability of default is high enough, preferring to use that funds to
purchase riskless assets. This decision effects the total supply of credit to firms and,
through it, the total level of investments, output and employment.
When a financial crisis occurs, banks reduce their supply of interbank funds replicat-
ing, to some extent, the behaviour of the interbank market during the last crisis. Through
the definition of an endogenous default probability and the analysis of how it effects the
credit supply, it is possible to understand the connections between the behaviour of fi-
nancial markets and the real economy. The model, at last, is calibrated in order to test
the response of the system to exogenous shocks and to conventional and unconventional
economic policies.
1 Introduction
The last financial crisis has shown how even financial markets are far from the “perfect
competition” paradigm and how they are influenced by friction just as any other type
of market. The economic theory was, in some case, unable to predict the real extent of
the crisis and, at the beginning, to formulate effective policy measures to offset its effect
on the real economy (Bernanke (2013) [9], Guille´n (2011) [48], Thornton (2012) [75]).
These facts call for the formulation of new theories and models that try to describe
more realistically the behaviour of agents on the markets in order to understand some
of the dynamics that were not considered so far. The final objective of this struggle is
to understand why some of the policy measures carried out by policy makers were so
uneffective and to develop new tools to counterbalance negative shocks (Claessens et
al. (2010) [23]).
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Economics needs, today, to develop new theries and paradigms in order to complete
its understanding of the more complex reality that it tries to describe1. In this context,
one of the key issue to analyze is the relationship between financial markets and the real
economy, trying to understand, from a macroeconomic point of view, which is the role
played by the probability of default and by financial frictions. In the past, this topic
was more popular in the literature on developing economies, for example in Ordon˜ez
(2009)[67], but now we know how it is important to study those issues also in more
advanced economies.
To answer to all those question it is necessary to understand the relationships that
exists between financial agents, to overcome the paradigm of the “rapresentative agent”
and to develop models that endogenize the default probability.
Regarding the first point, in the last years has been developed a robust literature
that exploits the proprieties of networks to understand the connection between economic
agents and, in particular, financial agents. In those kind of works the properties of
networks are exploited to analyze the mechanisms behind the trasmission of shocks
and the effects of monetary policies and bankrupcies on the economic system. Some
examples are given by Allen and Gale (2000) [4] and Delli Gatti et al. 2006 [31]2.
What I have tried to do is something different. Instead of building a formal network of
relationships between financial agents, I created an evirorment of heterogeneous agents,
partially following the set up of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [44], in which banks are
linked together by borrowing relationships that evolves and changes trought time3.
In order to develop my analysis, than, I had to introduce some form of heteorgeniety
between agents. In the recent years this field of research increased its importance as
economists have tried to overcome some limits connected to the rapresentative agent
framework. In particular, it has been shown how even keeping standard assumption,
with the introduction of some heterogeneity between agents it is possible to derive
significantly different results, than in the case of the “rapresentative agent”4. Basing
on these results, I believe that it is necessary to allow at least for some forms of het-
erogeneity if our models what to describe effectively the economic system. Moreover,
as it is now clear that the introduction of heterogeneity has a significant impact on
the equilibrium, allowing for that is necessary in order to avoid possible misleading
conclusions.
At last, it is not possible, in the wake of the last financial crisis, to not consider the
effects of financial frictions on the equilibrium. The last crisis has shown us how they can
considerably effect the economy, and economics researchers have started to incorporate
them in their models. The very first attempt was made by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist in (1999) [11] and gave birth to the research vein of “financial accelerator”
1Friedman (2012) [41], Krugman (2012) [58], Stiglitz (2010) [74], Turner (2012) [78].
2Additional references may be given by Beltratti et al. (1996) [8], Gale and Kariv (2007) [42],
Elliott et al. (2014) [35].
3In particular, I allowed for banks to bacome lenders or borrowers on the interbank market condi-
tioned on the realization of an exigenous shock.
4Branch and Evans (2005) [17], Delli Gatti and Longaretti (2006) [30], Hommes (2006) [52], Krusell
and Smith (2006) [59], de Graeve et al. (2010) [34], Motta and Tirelli (2010) [66].
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models5. Those models focused their attention on the relationshipbetween lender and
borrowers, in particular removing the assumption on the base of the Modigliani-Miller
Theorem6. But over the years economist have focused their attention on other sources
of friction. In particular after the world financial crisis, this particular field of research
experienced a consistent boost7. The topics that I believe are more interesting on this
field are the introduction of some elements of game theory in macroeconomic models,
that allow to incorporate some participation and incentive constraints to the agents
decision problems and the presence of agency problems8. To be more specific, I believe
that it is important to incorporate in our model the possibility that agents answers to
private incentives and may have convinience to cheat the opponent. This is, of course,
an assumption that does not give much credit people’s integrity, but we all know how,
expecially in the finance sector, immediate gains are prefered to the establishment of
long-run trust relationship9. For this reason I decided to explicitly include in my model
the presence of an incentive constraint in the financial sector.
But all these elements are not sufficient, in my opinion, to complitely understand
what happened in 2007, when our economy was hit by the greatest crisis since the Great
Depression.
With respect to what was observed in the 30s, the present crisis has followed a
different path and has displayed different dynamics, that have enlighten how tight now
is the connection between the financial sector and the real economy. What started as
a crisis on one single financial market, even not so important compared to the whole
financial transactions of the U.S. economy, rapidly spread through the financial system
and arrived, with a speed never seen before, to the real economy10. More importantly,
the tools I have previously presented, are not able to explain alone the sudden fall of
interbank loans we have observed after the initial shock. The role of the interbank
market was crucial. Suddenly, financial intermediaries stopped to lend money each
other, tightening the liquidity constraint that each of them faced and reducing even
more the credit supplied to firms11. It is clear that an important role was played by the
increased default probability12. For this reason, I decided to incorporate that variable
into my model and to endogenize it. This is, I believe, an important aspect of the
research. The role of the default probability was analized in the past years by several
empirical works13, but has received moderate attention in theorical researches.
5Just to make a coupple of example, it is possible to see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) [45],
Hammersland and Trae (2012) [49].
6Modigliani and Miller (1958) [64] and (1963) [65].
7For example, it is possible to see Bernanke and Gertle (1989) [10], Krishnamurthy (2003) [57],
Angeloni and Faia (2009) [6], Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [44], Brunnermeier et al. (2012) [19],
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) [20].
8On this topic, it is possible to see the already citated Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [44], and also
Phelan and Townsend (1991) [69], Dib (2010) [33], Meeks et al. (2013) [62].
9[5].
10Delli Gatti (2012) [29], Guille`n (2011) [48], Allen, Babus, Carletti (2009) [3].
11On this topic, can be seen Brunnermaier (2009) [18] and Gorton (2010) [46].
12De Socio (2011) [21].
13For example by Hong et al. (2009) [53], Heider et al. (2009) [51], Bracke (2010) [15].
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On this topic, the larger part of the studies comes from the microeconomic finance
literature14, although in the recent years there have been some attempts to incorporate
it into macroeconomic models15. Beside those attempts, I think that there is still the
necessity to develop a more comprehensive and complete framework that could allow
us to define the default probability as an endogenous variable. This is what I will try
to do in the following pages.
The last topic I want to cover in this paper is the effect of public policies during
financial crisis. In particular, I will start from some consideration about conventional
and unconventional policies16, in order to evaluate their effectiveness in the framework
I developed.
The paper will be developed as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3
presents some preliminary conclusions, section 4 discusses some unconventional mone-
tary policies that can be used by the public sector, sector 5 presents the calibration of
the model, section 6 discusses the results of the simulations carried out and in section
7 we have the final conclusions.
2 The Model
The economy of the model is populated by households, entrepreneurs, banks, Govern-
ment and a Central Bank.
Households, that are the only owners of firms, may be workers or bankers, with the
total number of bankers and workers fixed. Workers supply labor to firms and earns
wages; bankers run the banks and return their profits17 to families as dividends that
are paid only when a bank ends its activity. To avoid that banks accumulate enough
capital to overcome any kind of financial constraint, I assume that in each period there
is a probability that a bank ends its activity. In that case, the banker transfer all his
remaining assets to households and becomes a worker while households provide to new
bankers an initial endowment of capital. In each family there is perfect consumption
insurance between members. Households use their incomes to finance consumption, to
pay taxes and to save, in the form of the purchase of deposits.
Firms use labor and capital to produce final goods that are sold on a national
market and operate under perfect competition. They do not accumulate capital, so in
each period they have to borrow funds from the banking system in order to finance
their investments. Firms are located on different areas of the economy and can borrow
money only from banks located in the same area. In each period, in addition, there is
an exogenous probability that in an area emerge new investments opportunities. I am
following what proposed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and I call this probability pii
and the opposite probability pin = 1− pii.
14For example Leland and Toft (1996) [60], Diamond and Rajan (2001) [22].
15For example in Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) [73], Angeloni and Faia (2009) [6], Dib (2010) [33].
16Brunnermeier (2009) [18], Curdia and Woodford (2010) [26], Claessens et al. (2010) [23], Gertler
and Karadi (2011) [43], Thornton (2012) [75].
17As we are in perfect competition, profits are defined as the returns on the invested capital.
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The financial sector is composed by banks that raise liquidity from deposits and
interbank loans on national markets. Each bank may use its funds to finance interbank
loans, loans to firms or to acquire riskless assets. Banks are run by bankers, who
optimize the capital structure in order to maximize the value of the bank’s capital at
the end of the period. Because they run the bank, they can divert a fraction of the
total volume of funds intermediated and transfer it to households. If they do so the
bank defaults18. Each bank, at last, is located on a specific area and while it can
borrow on national markets, it can lend money only to firms located in its same area.
Bankers know if in their area there are new investment possibilities only after that the
period is already started, but they have to decide the level of deposit at the beginning
of each period, before that the shock is revealed. For this reason, some banks will
have excess funds while others will have a deficit of liquidity. Following Greenwald
and Stiglitz (2003) I assume that only banks on areas without new investments acquire
riskless assets, this assumption will be proved endogenously later on. What is crucial
for the development of the model is the way in which the credit cycle works: bankers
choose the level of deposits before the beginning of the period; than they know if there
are new investment possibility on their area and, than, they make their investment
choices. I assume also that there is some degree of uncertainty on the outcome of new
investments projects, for the reason that they are new and, therefore, banks have not
already developed the competences to precisely evaluate them.
For what concerns the last two agents of the model, the Central Bank and the
Government, I assume that the Central Bank sets the riskless rate and the Government
chooses the level of its consumption of final goods, that is treated as an exogenous
variable. We will see in the next section how we can model a more active role of both
these agents.
2.1 Households
Households may be either workers or bankers. Workers supply labor to firms in ex-
change for wages, while each banker runs a bank. Wages and profits from the banking
activity are transferred to households and within each family there is perfect consump-
tion insurance. The fraction(f) of workers and (1− f) of bankers is constant through
all the periods.
Because banks are finitely lived19, in each period a fraction 1−σ of bankers becomes
workers and, on the opposite, the same number of workers becomes bankers20. When
a bank is closed, the banker transfers all the assets to families that will provide the
starting capital for new bankers. Following standard assumptions, than, firms are
entirely owned by households.
18This dynamic leads to the definition of an agency problem between lenders and borrowers, follow-
ing, between the others, Kiyotaki and More (1997) [55], Kristhnamurthy (2003) [57] and Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2009) [38].
19In each period there is a probability σ that a bank closes.
20The workers becoming bankers are, following the assumption, (1− σ) f .
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Households get utility from consumption and leisure, can save acquiring bank’s
deposits and pays lump sum taxes.
Their objective function, therefore, is defined as:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt [lnCt + ν ln (1− Lt)] (1)
with C the consumption, and L the fraction of time devoted to work. v the weight
of labor disutility equal to the elasticity of leasure and βt is a discount factor.
If we define Dh the deposits in one type of bank, R
D the interest rate granted on
them between t and t+121, T the taxes paid22, W the nominal wage, Π the profits of
firms and banks transferred to families23 and Pt the price level, it is possible to define
the budget constraint as:
Ct +Dh,t+1 +
Tt
Pt
≤ Wt
Pt
Lt +
Πt
Pt
+
RDt−1Dh,t
Pt
(2)
from the solution of the households decision problem, it is possible to derive the
following equilibrium conditions:
1
Ct
= λCt (3)
ν
1− Lt =
Wt
Pt
λCt (4)
Etβ
tλ
C
t+1
λCt
RDt
Pt
= 1 (5)
Ct +
Dh,t+1
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Lt +
Πt
Pt
+
RDt−1Dh,t
Pt
(6)
with
{
λCt
}∞
t=0
the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers associated to the optimization
problem, that also define the real marginal utility.
Equations (3) and (4) describe the optimal choice of consumption and leisure, and
link together the choice of consumption and hours devoted to work. They also describe
the demand of goods and the supply of labor. Equation (5) describes the Euler condition
on deposits and says that the riskless rate must be such that it equalities the present
21It will be proved that the interest rate on deposits is equal to the riskless interest rate in the
equilibrium.
22Following the well established literature on this topic, started with Ramsey (1927) [71], taxes are
assumed to be a lump-sum.
23Πt = Π
B
t + Π
F
t , with Π
B the dividends of banks and ΠF the profits of firms.
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discounted marginal utility of future consumption with the marginal utility of present
consumption. The last equation allows us to determine the value of deposits in t+1
given the optimal choice of all the other variables and the constants.
2.2 Good producers
Firms operate in perfect competition and produce homogeneous goods. They combine
labor and capital with Cobb-Douglass production function:
Yt = AtK
a
t L
(1−a)
t 0 < a < 1 (7)
with A, the productivity of factors, that evolves following a Markov process24. The
total cost function is given by:
TC =
Wt
Pt
Lt + ZtKt (8)
with Z the gross profits for unit of capital. From the firm’s optimization problem
it is possible to derive the following first order conditions:
Wt
Pt
Lt
1− α =
ZtKt
α
(9)
Zt =
Yt − WtPt Lt
Kt
= αAt
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α
(10)
equation (9) defines the demand for labor, while equation (10) defines the gross
profits per unit of capital. Firms do not accumulate capital, so in each period they
have to finance their investment with loans acquired from the banking system. As long
as they are able to obtain that funds, they do not face any other friction and commit
to pay to the creditor bank the gross profits per unit of capital. Each unit of equity, in
other words, is a claim to the future returns on one unit of investments:
ψt+1Zt+1, (1− δK)ψt+1ψt+2Zt+2, (1− δK)2 ψt+1ψt+2ψt+3Zt+3 . . .
δK describes the rate of depreciation of capital while ψt+1 describes the effect a shock
on the quality of capital. This last term, following the finance literature25, has been
24See Bharucha-Reid (1960) [12]. Among recent papers that use this assumption there are Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) [44], Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) [20] and Gourio (2009) [47].
25For example in Merton (1973) [63].
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introduced to describe in a simple way an exogenous source of variation in the value
of capital and evolves following a Markov process26. Firms use loans from the banking
system to acquire capital goods from capital goods producers. Because they operate in
perfect competition, they earn 0 profits in the equilibrium. Given this assumption, it
is possible to define the rate of returns on each unit of financed equity, that is given by:
Rh,Kt =
[
Zt + (1− δK)Qht
]
Qht
(11)
with h = i, n. The rate of returns on each unit of capital is given by the gross profits
plus capital gains or losses.
In each period, as we know, there is a probability pii that firms on an area have new
investment opportunities and, on the contrary, a probability pin that they have not. It
is possible, than, to define a law of motion of capital as follows:
Kt+1 = ψt+1
{[
It + pi
i (1− δK)Kt
]
+ pin (1− δK)Kt
}
= ψt+1 {It + (1− δK)Kt} (12)
with I the value of new investments. Therefore, the aggregate demand for loans on
each type of area is given by:
Sht =
{
pin (1− δK)Kt for h = n
pii (1− δK)Kt + It for h = i (13)
2.3 Capital goods producers
Capital goods producers operate on a national market and make new capital using
input of final output, subject to an adjustment cost function. This function takes the
form of:
f
(
It
It−1
)
It
it is used to describe physical adjustments cost in the production process27, with
f (1) = f ′ (1) = 0 and f ′′
(
It
It−1
)
> 0. In this way the production function has decreasing
returns to scale in the short run and constant returns to scale in the long run. The price
26Among recent papers that use this assumption there are Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [44], Brun-
nermeier and Sannikov (2012) [20].
27The presence of physical adjustment costs is widespread in the literature, for example can be seen
Friedman and Woodford (2011) [40], Alid Dib (2010) [33] and Angeloni and Faia (2009) [6].
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at which these agents sell the new capital is driven to Qit
28 by the perfect competition
assumption. Capital goods producers, than, choose It in order to maximize the expected
profits. Their problem is given by:
maxEt
∞∑
t=0
βtΛCt
{
QitIt −
[
1 + f
(
It
It−1
)]
It
}
(14)
Because households are the only owners of firms, the discount factor is given by
βtΛCt
29.
From the solution of this problem, it is possible to derive the following equilibrium
condition:
Qit = 1 + f
(
It
It−1
)
+
It
It−1
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
− EtβtλCt
(
It+1
It
)2
f ′
(
It+1
It
)
(15)
the above equation has the role of a Tobin’s Q equation30 for the model and endo-
genizes the price of equity.
2.4 Financial system
The financial system is populated by finitely lived banks each of them run by a banker.
Each bank receives funds from capitalists and depositors and can access to a national
interbank market, where banks emit loans one to another. With the funds raised
each bank can acquire riskless assets, finance interbank loans or emit loans to firms.
Following Gertler e Kiyotaki (2010) [44], I assume that banks receive funds on national
market but that they can lend only on a local area. In other words, each bank can emit
loans only to firms that operate in his same area. The balance sheet of a representative
bank may be described as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Loans to firms Capital
Interbank loans Deposits
riskless assets Interbank debts
we also know that in each area of the economy there is an exogenous probability pii
that new investment opportunities arises for firms. Because the type of area in which
28New capital can be sold only on areas with new investments and the price of capital, due to the
perfect competition assumption is driven to its market value.
29ΛCt =
λCt+1
λCt
defines the households discount factor and is a function of the real marginal utility of
consumption. For the economic meaning of the lagrangian multiplier, see Cowell (2006) [24].
30Brainard and Tobin (1968) [16], Tobin (1969) [76].
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the bank will operate is revealed after the beginning of each period, when bankers have
already decided the level of deposits, the banks on areas with new investments do not
have sufficient funds to finance all the investments projects of firms31. For this reason
they ask interbank loans to banks on areas without new investment opportunities, that
can only refinance the investments of the previous period and, thus, have a surplus of
funds. A key aspect of the model is the choice of this second group of banks. As we
will see later, lending banks on the interbank market can decide to invest their excess
of liquidity on interbank lendings or on riskless assets; when the economy faces some
types of crisis, lending banks may decide to invest all their excess liquidity on riskless
assets, not financing any interbank loan and causing a reduction of credit to firms.
What is important to understand now, is that only banks on areas without new
investment decide to invest part of their funds on the interbank market or on riskless
assets, because, as long as there are investment projects to be financed, it is more
convenient to invest on them32. The last assumption that I make is that there is some
degree of uncertainty on the returns of loans issued to firms on new investment island.
What I am saying is that banks are not able to forecast exactly the returns on the
investment projects on areas with new investment possibilities and may pay additional
cost of monitoring. To take this into account, I assume that there is an exogenous shock
on the returns of loans to firms for banks on “i” areas. This shock takes the form of a
stochastic variable xi,t with E (xi,t) = 0, V ar (xi,t) = σx > 0 that spans on an interval
[−h;h] with a uniform distribution and probability 1
2h
33.
We know that banks pay dividends to households only when they end their activity,
that can occur in each period with a probability σ34. When a bank exits the market,
the banker transfers all the accumulated net worth to households; in all the previous
periods, on the contrary, he accumulates the profits35 to increase the bank’s net worth.
The objective of the banker, than, is to maximize the sum that he can transfer to
households at the end of each period. Because he runs the bank, I assume that he can
divert to households a part of the total funds intermediated by the bank
(
Ah,Bt
)
except
for those acquired on the interbank market36, leading to the default of the bank. He
decides to do so only if the expected value of the assets he can transfer is bigger than
the expected value of the net worth at the end of the period
(
nht+1
)
. We can simply
define their objective function as:
31Banks choose their level of deposits before of the realization of the shock. Therefore, they choose
an average level between the two optimum in each of the possible state of the world.
32This follows what discussed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) [73] and will be endogenously proved
in the next pages.
33For the modelization of the shock I followed Angeloni e Faia (2010) [6] and Diamond and Raja
(2001) [32].
34This assumption is necessary to avoid that banks accumulate enough capital to become financially
unconstrained.
35The banking system operates in perfect competition, for profits I intend the returns on the invested
capital.
36I am assuming that private banks are more efficient in monitoring their counterparts than depos-
itors.
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V ht = max
{
Et
(
nht+1
)
; θ
(
Ah,Bt
)}
(16)
with
Ah,Bt =
{
Qits
i
t − bt for h = i
Qnt s
n
t + bt + ft for h = n
with sht the volume of loans to firms emitted by each type of bank at the price Q
h
t ,
bt the value of interbank loans, ft the value of riskless assets and θ the fraction of assets
that bankers can divert37. The net worth of each type of bank, at the end of the period,
is given by the sum of the net worth at the beginning of the period plus the returns on
the invested capital.
From equation (16) it is straightforward to see how arises an agency problem. In
fact, the bank’s creditors will not lend to the banker an amount of funds high enough
to make Et
(
nht+1
)
< θ
(
An,Bt
)
, because, in this case, the banker will divert a fraction θ
of the active, the bank will default, and they will lost the investment. For this reason,
we end up having an additional constraint on the bank’s activity, that states that in
each period the volume of funds “divertible” by the banker must be smaller than the
expected value of the bank’s net worth at the end of the period. As long as it holds,
bankers will not divert any part of the funds they are intermediationg. It is possible,
than, to define two incentive constraints, one for each type of bank:
Et
(
nit+1
)
≥ θ
(
Qits
i
t − bt
)
(17)
Et
(
nnt+1
)
≥ θ (Qnt snt + bt + ft) (18)
the last thing to do before formally analyze the decision problem of banks in each
of the two possible state of the world is to formally define the bank’s budget constraint,
that is given by:
Qits
i
t = n
i
t + dt + bt (19)
Qnt s
n
t + bt + ft = n
n
t + dt (20)
37Banks on innovative areas invest only in loans to firms, so their active is constituted only by them.
On the contrary, banks on areas with no innovation invest also in interbank loans and riskless assets.
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2.4.1 Banks on areas with new investment possibilities
Banks on these areas do not have enough funds to supply all the credit demanded
by firms, and so they have to ask for interbank loans. We also know that there is a
stochastic variables that effects the effective returns on loans to firms. As long as the
constraint given by equation (17) is satisfied, bankers that operate on this type of areas
will have the objective to maximize the expected net worth at the end of each period.
We can, finally, formally define the net-worth at the end of each period for this type of
banks as:
Et
(
nit+1
)
= Et
[(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
ψtQ
i
ts
i
t −RBt bt −RDt dt + χinit
]
(21)
with Ri,Kt the expected returns on loans to firms between t and t+1 defined as
[Zt+(1−δK)Qit]
Qit
, dt the deposits acquired by each bank and R
B
t the interbank’s interest
rate between t and t+1. The objective function of this type of banks, than, can be
defined as:
Et
∞∑
t=0
ΛBt n
i
t+1 (22)
ΛBt ≡ (1− σ)σtβtΛCt
Et
(
nit+1
)
= Ri,Kt ψtQ
i
ts
i
t −RBt bt −RDt dt + nit
because banks are owned by households, the discount factor of bank’s profits is given
by βtΛCt .
The decision problem of the representative bank, than, can be defined as the maxi-
mization of equation (22) under the constraints given by equations (17) and (19).
The solution to that problem leads to the following equilibrium conditions38:
Ri,Kt ψt −RBt = 0 (23)
RBt −RDt =
λitθ
(ΛBt + λ
i
t)
(24)
Ri,Kt ψtQ
i
ts
i
t −RBt bt −RDt dt + nit ≥ θ
(
Qits
i
t − bt
)
(25)
38If we take the expectation it is true that Et
(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
= Ri,Kt .
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with {λit}∞t=0 the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers associated to the problem. It
is trivial to show how the solution to the problem is a corner solution. Equation
(23) defines an Euler condition for banks on areas with new investments, and defines
the interest rate on the interbank market. As long as it is satisfied, banks on this
type of areas will acquire all the interbank credit supplied. Equation (24) defines the
riskless rate as a mark down on the interbank market rate. Combined with the previous
equation it is also defined as a mark down on the real returns on investments. The last
relationship is the incentive constraint that holds with the equality if λit > 0. We can
plug into it the budget constraint to get to:
τ itn
i
t +$
i
tbt ≤ φitQitsit (26)
with τ ≡
(
RDt + χ
i
)
, $ ≡
(
RDt + θ −RBt
)
, φ ≡
(
RDt + θ −Ri,Kt
)
. The previous
equation defines the supply of loans to firms on areas with new investments. As it can
be seen, it depends positively from the total amount of interbank borrowing received
by banks on this type of areas. If bt = 0, it is just defined as a mark-up on the bank’s
net worth at the beginning of each period.
2.4.2 Banks on areas without new investment possibilities
The analysis of the choice for banks that end up operating on areas without new
investments is a bit more complicated. In fact they can invest in loans to firms and
banks or in riskless assets. In addition, there is the effect of the stochastic shock that
influences, as it will be explained later, the returns on interbank loans. If the realization
of the shock is sufficiently small, the debtor bank is not able to refund the total value of
the loans received and it defaults. In that case, of course, the creditor will receive less
or nothing of the original value of the loan. We can start analyzing how the variable
xi,t influences the choice of lending banks. As long as the realized value of the shock is
positive, so it falls in the interval [0;h], banks on investment areas have no problem to
pay back their debts. On the contrary, if xi,t ∈ [−h; 0), banks may not be able to refund
all their creditors. If the shock falls in that interval, banks have to use part of the net
worth accumulated in the previous periods to refund their debts. As always, at first are
refunded the depositors and only after them, with what is left, are refunded interbank
loans. From this assumption we can define two critical values of the shock. One that
defines the lowest value of xi,t that sill allows the debtor bank to refund all its creditors
using all the net worth accumulated in the previous periods. The second defines that
realization of xi,t for which the bank is able to totally refund only its depositors. What
is left after that they are served is insufficient to fully refund interbank loans; in this
case the debtor bank defaults and the lending banks, after having paid some default
costs, acquire what is left. We can define the first critical value of the shock as that
value that drives to zero the bank’s assets after that the creditors are paid:
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0 =
(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
ψtQ
i
ts
i
t + n
i
t −RDt dt −RBt bt
we can solve for xi,t and call that value α:
a =
bitR
B
t − nit +RDt dt
ψtQits
i
t
−Ri,Kt (27)
it is possible to see how this value grows as the cost of borrowing grows and decreases
in the value of the assets of banks on investment areas and in the returns on the firm’s
capital. In the second case, the creditor bank pays some default costs and acquires
what is left of the debtor bank assets after that its depositors are served. The lending
bank will make this choice only as long as what it gets is higher than the default costs.
We can derive the critical value of the shock, under which the creditor bank will get 0,
as the solution of:
0 =
(
RiKt+1 + xi,t
)
ψtQ
i
ts
i
t + n
i
t −RDt+1dt − C
it is possible to solve for xi,t and call that value a
′:
a′ =
−nit +RDt dt + C
ψtQits
i
t
−Ri,Kt (28)
with C defines the default costs. It is straightforward to see how this value increases
as the default costs and the cost of deposits decrease and the net worth, the value of
assets and the returns on firm’s capital increase.
We can now identify three areas of the p.d.f. of xi,t. In the first if xi,t ∈ [−h; a′] the
lending bank does not receive anything, in the second, if xi,t ∈ (a; a′) the lending bank
obtains what is left after that are paid the debtors and the default costs and, in the last
one, if xi,t ∈ [a;h] the lending bank is fully repaid. It can be noticed how if the value
of the shock is larger than a but smaller than 0, the debtor bank does not complitely
default, but uses its net worth to pay back its debts. But that influences the critical
levels for the next period, according to equations (27) and (28).
It is straightforward to define a payment distribution function for the lending bank,
that describes the expected returns on interbank loans:
Ft = 1
2h
a′
−h
0dxi,t +
1
2h
a
a′
[(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
ψtQ
i
ts
i
t + n
i
t −RDt dt − C
]
dxi,t +
1
2h
h
a
RBt btdxi,t
(29)
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if the shock falls in the interval between [−h;α] the debtor bank defaults and its
creditor is able to savage only a part of the investment.
We can now define the value of the net worth at the end of each period, for a
representative bank on an area without new investment possibilities that is given by:
Etn
n
t+1 = n
n
t +R
n,K
t ψtQ
n
t s
n
t + Ft +RFt ft −RDt dt (30)
with RFt the riskless interest rate that is equal to the interest rate on deposits in
the equilibrium.
The objective function of this type o banks, than, is given by:
Et
∞∑
t=0
ΛBt n
n
t+1 (31)
ΛBt ≡ (1− σ)σtβtΛCt
this function should be maximized under the constraints given by equations (18)
and (20). The problem appears quite complicate at a first look, but it is possible to
simplify it with some easy passages. Consider the incentive constraint. It states that:
nnt +R
n,K
t ψtQ
n
t s
n
t + Ft +RFt ft −RDt dt ≥ θ (Qnt snt + bt + ft)
if we consider the worst case, when the left part of the equation is minor, it is possible
to show that this constraint is inactive for banks on areas without new investments.
First of all, the left part of the equation is minimum when banks do not invest on the
interbank market. This happens when the possibility of default is so high that the
expected returns on interbank loans is inferior to expected returns on riskless assets.
In this case, the previous constraint collapses to:
nnt +R
n,K
t ψtQ
n
t s
n
t +R
F
t ft −RDt dt ≥ θ (Qnt snt + ft)
if we plug in the budget constraint, ft = n
n
t + dt −Qnt snt , we get to:
nnt +R
n,K
t ψtQ
n
t s
n
t +R
F
t (n
n
t + dt −Qnt snt )−RDt dt ≥ θ (Qnt snt + nnt + dt −Qnt snt )
(
1 +RFt
)
nnt +
(
Rn,Kt −RFt
)
ψtQ
n
t s
n
t ≥ θ (nnt + dt)
15
as it can be seen nnt > θn
n
t and R
F
t n
n
t +
(
Rn,Kt −RFt
)
ψtQ
n
t s
n
t +R
F
t nt > θdt; therefore,
the constraint is always satisfied and it is not active.
The problem now is reduced to the maximization of equation (31) under the budget
constraint and the non negativity constraint for bt. The first constraint is always biding,
so we can plug it in the objective function and simplify the problem to an unconstrained
optimization. From the solution of that problem, we can derive the following first order
conditions:
Rn,Kt ψt −RFt = 0 (32)
this equation states that as long as the real interest rates paid on loans to firms on
areas without new investments is higher than the riskless rate, banks will supply all the
credit demanded from the private sector. This means that as long as there is demand
for loans, banks will use their liquidity to finance them and not interbank loans. The
optimum condition on deposits is given by:
RFt = R
D
t (33)
this equation proves the assumption we made at the beginning, deposits are remu-
nerated at the riskless interest rate in the equilibrium. As long as this condition holds,
banks will acquire all the deposits supplied by households. If we combine this rela-
tionships with the previous one, it is possible to get to a more interesting conclusion.
In fact, comparing equation (32) with equation (23) we can now see how the price of
assets on areas without new investments is lower than the price of assets on areas with
new investments. This result is obtained simply plugging into that relationships the
definitions of the riskless interest rate and of the interbank rate. The economic reason
behind this conclusion is very simple, and is connected to the fact that on innovative
areas there is an excess of demand for loans, that increases the price of capital.
Until now we have derived the supply of loans, that is equal to the demand, for
areas without new investments and the condition at which banks acquire deposits from
households. It is necessary now to find what use banks on this type of areas make
of their excess liquidity, that remains them after that they have served all firms. It is
possible to derive the optimum condition for the supply of interbank loans, for a generic
bank, that is given by:
b∗t =
[
−RBt
C
Qits
i
t
+RBt h−
(−nit +RDt dt
ψtQits
i
t
−Ri,Kt
)
−
(
RFt − µt
)
2h
]
ψtQ
i
ts
i
t
(RBt )
2 (34)
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where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the non negativity constraint for
bt. The previous relationship defines the supply of interbank loans from banks with a
surplus of liquidity to banks with a deficit of liquidity. If µt > 0 the bank will not invest
any fraction of its surplus liquidity on the interbank market. The supply of interbank
loans increases as the cost of default decreases, as the net worth, the value of the assets
of the debtor banks and the returns on investments on innovative islands increase39 and
decreases as the riskless rate, that is the opportunity cost of every euro invested on the
interbank market, increases. At last, the dispersion of revenues, given by the parameter
h decreases the supply of interbank loans. We can now compute the equilibrium value
of riskless assets held by each bank of this type from the budget constraint, that is
given by:
f ∗t = n
n
t + dt − ψtQnt snt − b∗t (35)
at last, it is also possible to define the probability of a default(δ) to occur40, simply
as the probability of a shock to fall in the interval [−h;α]:
δ =
1
2h
a
−h
1dxi,t =
1
2h
(a+ h) (36)
as it can be seen, because α is a negative number, the probability of default increases
as the dispersion of revenues increases. In addition, we can see how in each period the
probability of default is defined by the financial conditions of debtor banks. It is also
possible to compute the expected payoff for interbank lenders in case of default, that is
given by:
1
2h
a′
−h
0dxi,t +
1
2h
a
a′
[(
Ri,Kt + xj,t
)
ψtQ
i
ts
i
t + n
i
t −RDt dt − C
]
(37)
if it is divided for the total amount of interbank loans of the period, it defines the
fraction of the value of loans that the banks are able to save after that a default occurs.
39This is quite intuitive, all these variables increase the active of the debtor bank and. So, on one
hand they increase the pay off of the interbank lender in case of default, on the other they reduce the
default probability.
40For a default I intend a default on a loan, so also the case that a bank defaults on a loan but uses
its net worth to refund the creditor.
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2.4.3 Aggregation
Because the condition of banking and the choices of banks are different depending on
the type of area on which they operate in each period, it is not possible to aggregate
through all the areas, but we can do so only between banks on the same area.
We can start from banks on areas without new investments(capital letters define
aggregate variables). As they are all equal between them, it is possible to aggregate
through them, to get to the supply function of loans to firms, that is given by:
Snt =
1
Qnt
(pinNt + pi
nDt −Bt − Ft) (38)
with, according to equation (13), Snt = pi
n (1− δK)Kt.
The total supply of interbank loans is given by:
B∗t =
[
−RBt
C
QitS
i
t
+RBt h−
(−piiNt + piiRDt Dt
ψtQitS
i
t
−Ri,Kt
)
−
(
RFt − µt
)
2h
]
ψtQ
i
tS
i
t
(RBt )
2
(39)
and the total value of riskless assets by:
F ∗t = N
n
t +Dt − ψtQnt Snt −B∗t (40)
on the other type of areas, the total supply of loans to firms is given by:
τ itpi
iNt +$
i
tB
∗
t ≤ φitQitSit (41)
with, according to equation (13), Sit = pi
i (1− δK)Kt + It. It is easy to see how
the value of the previous relationship is influenced by equation (39). In this way, the
choices of lending banks directly influences the supply of credit to firms and, because
firms relay completely on bank’s loans to finance their activity, the level of output,
employment and consumption of the system.
Before moving on to the next section, we must define a low of motion for bank’s
capital. In each period, on each type of areas, the bank’s net worth at the end of the
period is equal to the sum of the capital accumulated in the previous periods plus the
gain or losses from the banking activity. At the end of the period, however, a fraction
of banks quits and, therefore, the value of their capital is transferred to households who
supply the initial capital for new banks. Therefore, at the beginning of the new period,
the aggregate bank’s net worth is given by the sum of the bank’s capital at the end
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of the period, minus the capital of the banks that have quit plus the transfers from
households to new banks. We can than set up the equality:
Nt = N
o
t−1 +N
y
t−1 (42)
with Nt the bank’s capital at the beginning of each period, N
o
t−1 the bank’s capital of
surviving banks and Nyt−1 the bank’s capital of new banks, that is equal to the transfers
received from households. It is straightforward to define the transfer as a fraction of
total assets:
Nyt = ξ
{
pii
[
Zit + (1− δQ)Qit
]
ψtS
i
t + pi
n [Znt + (1− δQ)Qnt ]ψtSnt
}
(43)
with ξ a positive parameter smaller than 1. The capital of surviving banks is
equal to the value of the capital of banks that survives from t-1 to t, that is equal to
N ot = σ (N
i
t +N
n
t ). I call N
i
t the value of capital of banks on areas with new investments
at the end of each period. It is simply equal to the value of the bank’s active after that
are repaid all its creditors. This value, of course, is influenced by the effective returns
on investments, and so by the realization of the stochastic shock. It is, than, defined
by:
N it =
1
2h
a
−h
0dxi,t +
1
2h
h
a
[
Ri,Kt + xi,t
]
QitψtS
n
t + pi
iNt − piiRFt Dt −RBt Btdxi,t (44)
the first integer describes the case in which the bank defaults as a consequence of
the realization of the shock. Similarly, it is possible to define Nnt the aggregate value
of capital the end of period t-1 for banks on areas without new investments as the
sum of the capital at the beginning of the period plus the returns on the investments.
Therefore, we can set up the equality:
Nnt = R
n,k
t ψtQ
n
t S
n
t − pinRFt Dt + ΠBt +RFt Ft (45)
with ΠBt−1 the profits on interbank loans that are defined as:
1
2h
a′
−h
0dxi,t+
1
2h
a
a′
[(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
ψtQ
i
tS
i
t +N
i
t − piiRFt Dt − C
]
dxi,t+
1
2h
h
a
RBt Bt (46)
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the value of bank’s capital at the beginning of each period on each type of area is
given by piiNt = N
i
t for areas with new investment opportunities and pi
nNt = N
n
t for
areas without new investment opportunities.
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium on the goods market is given by the well-known relationship:
Yt = Ct + It
[
1 + f
(
It
It−1
)]
+Gt (47)
if we plug in the optimal values of consumption and investments, we obtain an IS
curve augmented for the adjustment costs. On the supply side of the good market, the
supply is defined by the firms production function, given by equation (7), after having
plugged in the optimal values of labor and capital.
The Central Bank sets the riskless interest rate on Government bonds.
The equilibrium on the credit market is granted by equations (13), (15), (39), (40),
(38) and (41); while on the labor market by equations (4) and (9). The total volume of
riskless assets in the economy is given by the sum of deposits and government securities
acquired by banks:
DTt = Dt + Ft (48)
3 Preliminary Conclusions
This model develops an economic system in which banks interact on the interbank mar-
ket. This fact, combined with the presence of the sthocastic shock has some interesting
consequences for the economy.
Independently by the presence of the incentive constraint, banks in surplus of liquid-
ity will never invest all their excess funds on interbank loans. In a world where banks
are able to forecast with perfect precision the outcome of new investments, equation
(29) would be reduced to:
RBt bt
and thus, remembering the definition of the riskless interest rate, the problem of
banks on areas without new investments would have a corner solution.
This result is critical for the economy, because firms are financially constrained in
their investments by the amount of loans emitted by banks. Only if banks invest all
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their excess liquidity on the interbank market it is possible to supply the maximum
ammount of credit demanded by firms in areas with new investment possibilities. For
this reason, if the shock on the returns is present, the price of capital will be different
between the areas of the economy, due to the excess demand of loans in some of them.
But this is only the first consequence. The introduction of the shock prevents also the
economy to reach its potential output, because firms do not receive all the credit they
need. As a consequence, consumption and employment are lower in this framework
than in the case in which the shock is not present.
This is a first interesting conclusion. Even if in a standard model is introduced some
uncertainty, banks will react shifting part of their funds on less risky assets. This leads
to a reduction of the total credit supplied by the banking sector.
We can see now what happens when the financial system faces a financial crisis. In
this framework, a financial crisis is related to a shock in the quality of capital(ψt).three
variables: a change in the dispersion of xi,t, a shock on the bank capital or on the
quality of capital.
The first shock is the more linked with the dynamics of the financial sector. If h, the
dispersion of the shock, increases, than the probability of default increases, according
to equation (36), and therefore the total amount of interbank loans decreases, according
to equation (39)41.
In that case, the effect is that the two critical levels a and a′ increase and, therefore,
the amount of loans supplied on the interbank market is reduced. This triggers a
reduction of the supply of the total supply of loans, that reduces the capital used by
firms in the production process and, as a conseguence, employment and output. The
final outcome is that production and consumption decrease while unemployment rises.
Also in this case the effect of a shock is persistent in the next periods, because the
bank’s capital does not rise as much as it could have done without the shock. In is
critical to remember that after any default, as we will see soon, the total bank’s net
worth is reduced and, therefore, it effects the values of a and a′ in the following periods.
The last thing to do is to analyze what happens when a default occurs. At first, the
capital of debitor banks go to zero and the creditor banks get only a fraction of what
originally lended. This leads to a permanent reduction in the bank’s capital. This will
have the consequence, in the next period, to permanently increase the value of a and
a′, to increase the default probability and to reduce the the total supply of loans by
any type of bank. The result on the real economy will be a reduction of output and
consumption and an increase of unemployment. This outcome is more severe the lower
is the realized value of xi,t.
The interesting things is that we assist to a similar effect also without a default on
the banking system. In fact, if the realized value of xi,t falls in the interval [a; 0] the
debitor bank does not defaults, but has to use part of its accumulated capital to pay
back its debts. But doing so, the aggregate value of bank’s capital at the end of the
period is reduced and, therefore, in the next period the values of a and a′ will be higher.
41As long as bt > 0 µt = 0. Therefore, for the definition of R
B
t and R
F
t , the negative effect is greater
than the positive effect, because the mark-up is define as smaller than one, according to equation (24).
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As seen before, this leads to a reduction of interbank loans and loans to firm.
What is interesting to notice, is that the endogenization of the default probability
has lead to the definition of some of the components that influence it. In addition, the
model answers to an increase in the default probability with a reduction of the supply of
interbank loans, allowing it to replicate some of the dynamics of the interbank market
during the crisis42. What we have observed in the markets is a drastic reduction of the
supply of interbank loans, following the subprime crisis, even if the interest rates on the
interbank market felt drastically. In this model, that dynamic is explained through the
connection between the expected returns on interbank loans and the value of bank’s
assets. In addition, the changes on the interbank market effect the real economy through
the total supply of loans that is directly connected to the amount of interbank credit
supplied.
But given this framework, what can the public sector do to offset a crisis? The
classic response of central banks is the reduction of the riskless rate, but in the last
years we have seen how this sometimes was ineffective and how central banks had to
use unconventional monetary policies43. To analyze what the Central Bank can do in
this framework, we can start to look of how the interbank interest rate must change
given a change in the default probability to maintain the same level of supply on the
interbank market, ceteris paribus:
the central bank can change the riskless rate in order to influence the interbank rate.
In any case, we know from equation (23) that the interbank rate can not be higher than
Ri,kt in order to have an active market. The graph shows how even for a rather small
increase in the default probability, there may not be a policy rate that offsets its effect
on the interbank market. Even if we allow for an increase in the percentage of the
42On this topic can be seen, between others: Heider et al. (2009) [51], Gorton (2009) [46], Brunner-
meier (2009) [20], Afonso, Kovner and Schoa (2010) [2], De Socio (2011) [21], Delli Gatti (2012) [29]
and Guille`n (2011) [48].
43On this topic, between others, can be seen Curdia (2007) [25], Reis (2009) [72], Claessens et al.
(2010) [23], Curdia and Woodford (2010) [26], Thorton (2012) [75] and Bernanke (2013) [9].
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original loan that the lending bank can obtain in case of default(a variation in the fix
costs of default) the conclusions do not change:
this means that a (negative)change in the riskless interest rate can have a scarce
effect on the supply of interbank loans, after a riskiness crisis. This results replicate
what was observed on the interbank market during the last financial crisis and what is
still going on. In fact, despite the low rates, the interest rate on the interbank market
is still low while the total volume of funds exchanged on the market is now about one
quarter of the pre-crisis levels.
This evidences calls for other types of policies to offset crisis. Following what emerges
from the analysis of the choice of lending bank, the main feature that leads to a reduction
of the supply of interbank lendings(and as a consequence of output and employment),
is the increase in the default probability. To offset this increase, the only way is to
operate on the causes that have lead to an increase in a and a′, that are the only
variables that defines the default probability and, at the same time, can be influenced
by policy makers. One way to do that, for example, would be to restore part of the
loss in the bank’s net worth or to counterbalance the decrease in the assets price. In
the next section will be presented some types of unconventional monetary policies.
4 Active Government and Central Bank
Until now we have supposed that the Central Banks just sets the riskless interest rate,
while the Government sets the exogenous level of public expenditure. In this section I
want to expand the model to allow for a more active role of the Government and the
Central Bank during “extraordinary times”.
For extraordinary times, I think to measure that the central bank may take during
a crisis, that in this model is associated to an increase of the value of a and a′, by the
effect of the exogenous shocks ψ and At or in case of a default on the interbank market.
This section will try to incorporate in the model some of the main measures adopted
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by the FED during the last financial crisis, to see how the model adapts to describe
some types of unconventional monetary policies44. I will discuss two different types
of unconventional monetary policies(liquidity facilities and equity injections), that the
FED has used according to Section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Acts that allows the
central bank, during “unusual and exigent circumstances”, to use also unconventional
policies to fulfill its role of lander of last resort.
4.1 Direct Lendings
With direct lendings the Central Bank acquires directly private securities from high
quality firms. In this way, the Central Bank expands directly the amount of investments
financed to the private sector substituting the banking system. This type of policy, as it
can be easily understood, can counterbalance the effect of a inactive interbank market.
In fact, if the supply of interbank loans falls to a value close to zero because of an
increase of a and a′, a simple reduction of the interest rate may not be sufficient to
increase the value of Bt. In this case, to expand the credit supply, the Central Bank
may find more convenient to directly finance non-financial corporations.
To incorporate this kind of policy in the model, we may think that the Central Bank
decides to increase the supply of loans on investment areas. The total loan supply in
that areas now becomes:
QitS
i
t = Q
i
t
(
Sip,t + S
i
g,t
)
(49)
where Sip,t is defined by equation (41) and S
i
g,t is the total amount of loans emitted
by the Central Banks. It is straightforward to see that direct lendings increase the
supply of loans in a proportion of one to one. If we assume that the Central Banks
decides to finance a fraction ζ it of the total loans emitted by private banks, than it is
easy to show how the total supply of loans on investment areas becomes:
QisS
i
t =
1
1− ζ it
[
φitN
i
t + τ
i
tBt
]
(50)
I assume also that the Central Bank faces additional cost for each unit of credit
emitted to the private sector, and I call that costs Θt. The central bank finances its
loan emission activity by emitting riskless assets that are a substitute to those emitted
by the Government. For this reason, each dollar of riskless assets emitted by the Central
Bank reduces the ammount of funds lended to the Government by one. As the Central
Bank can not default, we can apply to it the conclusions of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem.
44To the already mentioned Bernanke (2013) [9], Curdia and Woodford (2010) [26] and Thorton
(2012) [75]. I make explicit reference also to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [44].
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4.2 Equity Injections
In this last case the Government, through the action of the Central Bank, directly
invests in the capital of banks. It is a recapitalization of the banking system made by
the Government.
Doing so, the Government sustains additional costs equal to Υt to evaluate its
investments and monitor bankers. In addition we assume that the Government pays
each capital share QGt > Qt and detains its shares until the bank closes, when it receives
the value of the capital plus its share of the returns on the bank’s net worth.
In this way, at the beginning of each period, the total bank’s capital is given by:
Nt+1 = (N
o
t +N
y
t ) +N
g
t (51)
after the beginning of each period, than, a fraction pii of N gt will increase the capital
on areas with new investments and a fraction pin on areas without new investments.
Thus, the new level of capital on each type of area is:
N it+1 = pi
i (N ot +N
y
t +N
g
t ) (52)
Nnt+1 = pi
n (N ot +N
y
t +N
g
t ) (53)
again, on one hand this increases the amount of credit that banks on areas with new
investments can supply directly to firms and, on the other, it increases the volume of
interbank loans. This increase is due to two effects: the first is given by the increased
capital of banks without new investments and the second is due to the increase of the
capital of debitors banks that drives down the value of a and a′.
Also in this case, the efficiency of the policy depends on the parametrization of the
model. To compare this policy with the previous two we know that each unit of capital
injections has a cost equal to Υt but it increases the total credit supply by pi
i + pin ∂Bt
∂Nt
.
A different way to implement this policy may be to supply funds to banks that
operate on investment areas. In this way the government would be sure that banks will
use the additional capital provided to finance firms. In this case the new values of net
worth will be:
N it+1 = pi
i (N ot +N
y
t ) +N
g
t (54)
Nnt+1 = pi
n (N ot +N
y
t ) (55)
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4.3 New Government Budget
Now we have defined a more active public sector than the one described in the original
model. As a consequence, it is necessary to define new equilibrium equations that
describes the public budget and the public demand for goods.
At first, the component that describes the public expense, now called Gt, in the
demand equation is defined by
Gt = Gt + Θt
∑
h=i,n
QgtS
h
g,t + Υt
∑
h=i,n
pihNt (56)
with Sg,t the total volume of direct lendings to firms and pi
hNt the value of capital
injections on each type of island.
The total demand of public goods is equal to the sum of the “canonical” public
expense plus the additional costs connected to each kind of policy developed.
The second significant change must be made to the public budget equation, that
now must take into account also the liquidity flows connected to each policy. The new
public budget equation now is described by:
Gt +Q
G
t
∑
h=i,n
pih [Nt − (1− δK)ψtNt−1] +
∑
h=i,n
Qht
[
Shg,t − (1− δK)ψtShg,t−1
]
+ (57)
+Ztψt (Nt−1 + Sg,t−1) = Tt +Dg,t
With, of course, Sg,t =
∑
h=i,n S
h
g,t.
The new budget equations, as always, equalies the Government’s incomes with the
Government’s expenses; in this case, however, Government’s incomes and expenses are
augmented by the revenues on the economic policies developed.
5 Parametrization
The model is parametrized following the U.S. economy; values assigned to standard
preference and technology parameters are reported in Table 1. For those parameters I
used conventional values well established in the macroeconomic literature.
The definition of the steady state rates between the variables of the model was made
using the data provided by the Federal Reserve Database.
The value of the financial-sensitive parameters(pii, pin, σ and ξ) is define following
what proposed by Gertler and Kiyotaky (2010); those values are reported in Table 2.
Parameter h describes the dispersion on the returns of corporate bonds. As it has
been proved in the empirical literature on this subject, its connection with the output
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depends on several variables such as the functional form of the production function
or the preferences of households. Some examples of empirical works on these themes
are given by Bloom et al. (2012) [13], Knotek and Khan (2011) [56] and Panousi and
Papanikolaou (2011) [68]45. For this model, I estimated h following what proposed
by Angeloni and Faia (2010) [6] using the data from Bloom et al (2012) [13]. The
benchmark value of h is reported in Table 2.
Default costs are estimated following James (1991) [54] and Davydenko et al. (2012)
[28]. Therefore, the cost of default has been parametrized as a percentage of total assets
in the equilibrium.
Shock processes are modelized as Markov processes with standard error equal to 1.
I simulated 7 types of shocks: a productivity shock(At); a financial shock on the quality
of capital(ψt); an interest rate shock(given by a reduction of the riskless rate R
F
t ); a
positive fiscal shock(given by an increase of public consumption Gt); a direct lending
shock(given by the reduction of 1% of government spending to finance direct lendings);
two equity injection shocks one that hits the whole banking system the other that hits
only banks on investment areas.
As we know from the previous paragraphs, there are costs associated to each of these
three policies. I setted those costs as equal to 1% of the total ammount of resources
invested in the policy. Computational results shows that the conclusions derived from
this parametrization are robust to different choices parameters46.
6 Shock Response
The economy of the model is effected by 7 types of shock, two exogenous shocks and
5 policy shocks. The exogenous shocks are given by either a productivity shock or
a financial shocks. Policy shocks are given by the different types of public policies
seen in the previous paragraphs. In particular the public sector may intervene in the
economy either with classical policies, such as an increase of public consumption or
a reduction of the target rate by the Central Bank , or with unconventional policies.
Unconventional policies are defined by direct lendings or equity injections. In this last
case, the Government can decide if intervene on the whole banking sector or if acquire
equity of banks that operate only on investment islands.
Impulse response functions can be found in the appendix, results are showned as
percentage deviation from the steady state.
6.1 Aggregate productivity shock
The shock is simulated as an increase of 1% over the steady state value of the parameter
At. Impulse response functions are reported in figure 1.
45Further references are Arellano et al. (2010) [7], Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009) [37], Hassler
(1996) [50]
46I simulated the model for costs equal to 5%, 10% and 15% of the total resources invested without
significant changes in the results.
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A productivity shock leads to an immediate increase of the output, that is immedi-
ately reduced to small values but persists in the long run due to the persistent increase
in the use of both inputs of production. On the other hand, it has neglectible effects
on consumption, while it reduces the interest rates. Those effects, however, dies out
rapidly and the variables returns quickly to the steady state. On the contrary, there
are more persistent results on employment and capital, with small but persistent devia-
tions from the steady state after a positive shock. Those deviation leads to a persistent
increase in the economy’s output, that persists as long as those variables are over the
steady state level.
The financial sector, in this case, plays a crucila role. As it can be seen from figure 1,
after the shock we have a persistent increase in the loans supply on both types of areas.
This increase allows firms to use more capital and, therefore, more labor and sustains
the increase in the output. If we want to understand the reasons behind this increase
in the loans supply we have to look at the second IRF of figure 1. We can see how,
just after the shock, banks increase their acquisition of riskless assets and, therefore,
reduces their interbank loans. We will explain this behaviour leater on, for now it is
important to notice how this effect immediately dies out. After two periods, in fact,
the bankig system changes its portfolio choice shifting resources from riskless assets to
interbank borrowing. When this happends, we observe the largest increase in the loans
supply and in the banks net worth. The cumulative effect of these last two passages(the
increase in bank’s net worth and in interbank loans) leads to the persistent increase
of loans supply and capital we have previously observed. In addition, the changes in
bank’s net worth and interbank loans are persistent and sustain the higher level of final
loans and production of the economy after the shock.
As it can be observed, the total supply of loans, of course, depends both from the
aggregate level of bank’s capital and from the supply of interbank loans. Therefore, we
observed that final loans to firms increase immediately after the shock(as a result of
the higher values of bank’s capital) but reach the maximum only after that we observe
a positive change also in the interbank supply.
The last question at which we need to answer is why immediately after the shock,
we assist to a decline of interbank loans and to an increase of the acquisition of riskless
assets. The reason is that immediately after the shock, we have an increase of the value
of the parameters α and α′. This leads to higher probability of default and, therefore,
banks change their portfolio choice increasing the acquisition fo riskless assets. This
is a behaviour we have witnessed during the past financial crisis and that the model
wanted to incorporate. After some periods, however, the higher values of net worth(I
remember that the net worth at the end of period t gives us the values of the net worth
acailable in period t+1) and the higher values of the interest rates, lead to a reduction
of α and α′ allowing for a reduction of the default probability and an increase in the
interbank supply. It is interest to notice how the system stabilizes around a new, and
slightly lower, value of the default probability.
At last the chance in α dies out almost immediately, after that banks are able to
benefit from the increase of their net worth. This leads to a significant reduction of the
default probability, that benefits both from the reduction of α and α′ and the increase
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in the interest rates, and, therefore, to a increase of the interbank supply.
6.2 Aggregate shock on the quality of capital
In this case, I simulated an exogenous increase of the variable ψt. The impulse reponse
functions can be found in figure 2. As it can be imaged from the analysis of the equations
of the model, it is clear that this particular shock will have a significant impact on each
variable of the model, because of the central role of the financial sector in this economy.
Again, we assist to a significant and persistent increase in consumption and output,
with the increase in consumption, again, far below the increase in output. This result
is given by the higher use of the production’s inputs(capital and labor). As we have
seen in the previous chapter, this fact is due to the higher supply of loans, that boost
firm’s investments and production.
Along with the increase in the real variable, we can observe also an increase in the
interest rates.
If we analyse the behaviour of the finance sector, we notice how we observe a positive
effect on all its main variables(Ft, Bt and Nt).As we noticed in the previous paragraph,
we observe an initial decline in interbank loans along with a drastic increase of the
acquisition of riskless assets. This is due to the variable α tha increases as a conseguence
of the shock, leading to an increase of the default probability. However, this effect dies
out slowly, leading to a persistent lower probability of default. As a conseguence, the
acquisition of riskless assets declines and increases the supply of interbank loans. We
can see again how when the default probability increases, we have a significant increase
in the acquisition of riskless assets and a decrease in the total interbank borrowings.
Another important role is played by the bank’s net worth that increases significantly
after the shock and leads to an increase of all the other variables.
It is important, I think, to notice how this effects are persistent and dies out very
slowly. In case of a negative, shock, than, it may take a lot of time for the economy to
recover without any external help.
6.3 Fiscal shock
We can start now to analyse four different types of policies that the Government and
the Central Bank may use to offset crisis. The first is given by a classical positive fiscal
shock, given by an increase of the government spending. Outputs can be found in figure
3.
According to the DSGE theory, we observe a positive effect on the variables after
an increase of Governemtn spending. Similarly for the previous cases, the effect is
persistent, higher for the output than for consumption, but significantly smaller than
what observed in the previous cases.
The reson behind this is that the effect of a positive fiscal shock on the financial
sector is limited. In particular we observe an increase in the bank’s net worth, in
interbank loans and a decline of the acquisition of riskless assets. Those effects, however,
are far smaller than in the previous cases and, therefore, leads to a lower increase in
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the total supply of loans and of investments. This policy, however, has positives effects
on the variable and, in addition has the advantages of reducing the interest rates and,
at the same time, reducing the values of a and a′ leading to a lower default probability
that persists in time.
6.4 Monetary policy shock
I simulated a 1% reduction of the steady state interest rate. This leads the system out
of the equilibrium, with equation (33) not satisfied anymore. Outputs can be found in
figure 4.
We can observe as a reduction of the riskless interest rate has positive effects on
output and consumption. Again, the increase in the output is due to the more intese use
of the inputs. Similarly to the previous paragraphs, the increase in the use of the inputs
is given by the higher supply of interbank loans. To investigate the reasons behind that
increase, we have to observe the dynamics of the banking sector. An decrease of the
policy rates makes acquiring riskless assets less convinient and, therefore, banks shift
their liquidity towards interbank loans. Doing so, they increase their net worth and
this leads to lower default risk. As it can be seen by the graphs, the positive effect
on the probability of default dies out rather quickly, while the increase in net worth
is persistent. Similarly to the previous cases, it’s the increased value of the net worth
that sustains the persistency of higher-than steady state values of output, consumption,
investments and employment. Because that increase is persistent trought time, we
continue to observe out of the equilibrium values of those variables for prolonged periods
of time.
6.5 Unconventional policies: direct lendings
In this last two paragraphs I will analyse two different types of unconventional monetary
policies: direct lendings and equity injections. In the first case the Government, trought
the Central Bank, lends directly to private firms, increasing in this way the total supply
of loans on investment areas. I recall that in this case the Government faces additional
costs and may benefit, in the following periods, of the returns on its investments
I simulated an increase of loans equal to 1% of the steady state Government’s total
expenditure, setting the additional cost at 1% of the total fund used47. The outputs
are showned in figure 5.
This policy has a significant impact on the main economic variables. Output, con-
sumption, employment and capital icrease, driven by an increase in the total loans
supply. As it can be easily understood, the increase of the loans supply on areas with
new investments is larger than on areas without new investments. At the same time,
however, we assist to an increase of the interest rates and of the default probability. The
banking system answers to this policy with a first decrease in net worth and interbank
loans and with an increase in the riskless assets acquisition. This can be explained by
47As I stated in paragraph 5, the results are robust to different choice of the cost parameter.
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the fact that the public sector substitutes private banks in supplying loans to firms.
This drives down the demand for interbank loans, decreases total bank’s net worth and,
of course, increases the acquisition of riskless assets. After the initial shock, however,
private banks takes advantage of the higher interest rates, that allow them to con-
solidate their net worth and boost the supply of interbank loans. As interbank loans
become more convinient, they substitute riskless assets in banks ballance sheets. At
the same time, the increase in bank’s net worth drives down the default probability as
less leveredge banks have lower probability of default. To conclude, this policy has an
higher impact on the real variables than a classic expansion of the government spend-
ing but it also has the relevant disadvantage of increasing the systemic risk for several
periods.
6.6 Unconventional policies: equity injections
In this case, the Government finances banks throught the acquisition of new shares. I
simulated, again, the use of 1% of the steady state total Government expenditure to
finance this type of policy. In addition, I allowed for two different types of implementa-
tion of this particular unconventional policy. In the first case the government finances
all the types of bank, independently by the type of region in which they operate. The
second implementation of the policy, on the contrary, gives funds only to banks on areas
with new investments. The output of the first case is shown in figure 6 and those of
the second implementation in figure 7.
The most interesting part of this simulation is that the outcomes change drastically
depending on how the policy is implemented.
In the first case, when the government spending is used to finance the whole banking
system, the results are surprisingly negative for the economy. We assist to a reduction
of all the key real variables(output, employment and consumption), an increase in the
interest rates and a decrease in the total supply of loans. At the same time, the bank’s
net worth decreases leading to a decrease of interbank loans. In addition to this, we
can see also an increase in the default probability and in the parameters α and α′.
The reasons behind these particular results are complex and related to the particular
structure of the finance sector. The first thing to recalll is that in this framework only
a fraction pii of the inizial shock hits banks on investing areas. The remaining part,
that is also the major part of the shock, is assigned to areas without new investments.
In this way it does not increase the supply of loans to firms and, at the same time, it
does not effect the supply of interbank loans. In this way, we can explain the initial
increase in the purchase of riskless assets.
Now, as the demand for riskless assets increases, their price must go down and their
interest rate increase. Given the equations of the model, this leads to the increase in
the rates. As we do not observe an increase in bank’s net worth high enought to boost
the supply of interbank loans, the total supply of loans goes down, along with the use
of capital and, therefore, labor. These changes effect total output and consumption. A
generalized public help, than, appears to be unefficient.
We shell now move on to figure 7, in order to discuss the case of a policy that targets
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only areas where new investments are available.
As it immediately appears, the results with this type of implementation are far
better. Output, employment and capital increase following an increase of loans to
firms. The increase in the supply of loans is due to the increase in total net worth and
in interbank loans as long as to the decrease in the acquisitions of riskless assets. All
these result are persistent throught time but decreases to neglectible values betweeen
20 and 50 periods. Along with these results we see a slight decrease in the interest
rates, that dies out after less than 20 periods.
An additional interesting effect of this specification of the policy is that we have a
significant increase in the default probability, but it becomes negative in few periods
and than stabilizes below the previous steady state level. At the end, than, we have a
new steady state level of the default probability, lower than the original steady state
value.
6.7 Policies Experiments
From the analysis developed so far, it appears clear how, apparently, the best performing
policies are a monetary expansion and direct lendings. However, it could be interesting
to see how these policies actually behave in counterballancing a negative shock.
To do so, I simulated a 1% negative shock on the quality of capital, the same type
of shock that determined the world financial crisis. As an answer to that shock by the
private sector, I simulated a six periods stimulous policy, determined by a positive shock
of 1% on each of the previous policy variables repeated for 6 consecutive period by the
public sector. As the Government is able to intervene only after that the shock hits the
economy, I set the beginning of the policy package with one period of lag with rispect
to the original shock. Outputs are showned on figures from 8 to 12. As it can be seen
from the figures, a monetary expansion and direct lendings are the policies that appears
to perform better. Also in this case we can see how direct lendings have positive effects
on the real variables but increase the default probability, while the effect on the real
variables of a monetary expansion is smaller but has the advantage of positively effect
bank’s net worth, interbank loans and the default probability. Of course, expecially in
the present, it is very difficoult to image that a Central Bank could sustain a significant
reduction of the riskless rate for so many periods48. It appears better, than, to use
a mix of policies, instead of only one tool, to counterballance the effects of a crisis.
Simulations show, mixxing appropriately the previous policies, how the economy can
be stabilized also without the intervention of the central bank.
Repeating the same experiment with a negative productivity shock, it is possible to
come to the result that all the previous policies are efficient to stabilize the economy,
with the only exception of equity injections to the whole banking sector, that leads to
unstable outcomes.
48Pollin (2012) [70].
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7 Final Conclusions
The present model describes an economy in which etherogenous banks interacts between
them on the interbank market, making their choices of investment taking into account
the probability that their counterpart defaults. As it has been shown in the previous
paragraphs, the probability of default palys a crucial role in the economy of the model.
If it increases, banks shift their investments to riskless assets reducing therefore the
supply of interbank loans. This triggers a reduction of the total supply of loans to firms
and, therefore, we assist to a reduction in output, employment and consumption.
Analyzing the equations of the model is possible to identify the components that
defines the default probability to comprehend the effect that each of them has on the
economy. A preliminary result was that influencing those components would have had
positive effects on the economy reducing the systemic risk and, therefore, boosting
loans and investments. This preliminary speculation is confirmed by the simulations
carried out. In the previous section I have discussed how positive intervention on bank’s
net worth on areas with new investments positively influences the economy. However,
simulations proved also other important and significant results. On one hand, they
proved how a general intervention on the bank’s net worth may have negative effects on
the economy. This is caused by the fact that only a fraction of that intervention would
effect directly bank’s on investment areas and, therefore, reduce the default probability.
The larger part, on the contrary, would goes to banks on areas without new investment
that, because the default probability is still high, will invest in riskless asset. The other
interesting result is the positive effect of direct lendings policies. Simulations proved
that this policy tool is extremely effective, in this model, to counterballance negative
shocks. The reason behind this is that it effects directly firms, boosting investments
and output and generating the resources that are necessary to sustain the bank’s net
worth49 and couterballancing the negative effect of the shock. A last result is the
particular effective results of a positive monetary shock to the economy. This is due
to the fact that by reducing the riskless interest rate on one hand the Central Bank
reduces the cost of financing of banks in the next periods and, on the other, it makes less
convinient to acquire riskless assets, leading banks to shift part of their surplus funds
on the interbank market. Each policy, at last, was evaluated also making reference to
its effect on the systemic risk, given by the probability of default.
To conclude, I have presented a model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous
default on the interbank market, that is able, to some extent, to describe some dynamics
observed during the last crisis. This model is also useful to present some arguments
to evaluate poblic policies and to compare them. A possible direction for future works
would be to allow for heterogeneity also between firms and consumers, to intruduce the
possibility of credit to households and to evaluate the model in an open economy.
49I recall the results of equations (10) and (11); the output level influences the returns on investments
for banks.
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Appendix A: Parameters Values
Table 1
α Techology 0,33
β Discount Factor 0,99
δ Depreciation Rate 0,025
ε Preferences 0,1
ν Weight of Labor Disutility 3
C Default Costs 0,271Si∗
C/Y Cosumption to Output 0,67
I/Y Investment to Output 0,16
G/Y Government Spending to Output 0,17
T/G Taxes to Government Speding 0,59
Table 2
pii Probability of new investments 0,25
pin Probability of absence of new investments 0,75
σ Probability of bank’s exit 0,972
ϑ Inefficiency of the Interbank Market 0,383
h Dispersion of Returns 0,5
34
Appendix B: Impulse Response
Figure 1: 1% productivity shock
Figure 2: 1% shock on the quality of capital
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Figure 3: 1% fiscal policy shock
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Figure 4: 1% monetary policy shock
Figure 5: 1% direct lending shock
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Figure 6: 1% equity injection to all bank
38
Figure 7: 1% equity injection to banks on investing areas
Figure 8: Government spending policy
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Figure 9: interest rate policy
Figure 10: unconventional policy, direct lendings
40
Figure 11: unconventional policy, equity injection to all banks
Figure 12: unconventional policy, equity injection to banks on
investing areas
41
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